

Séminaire transdisciplinaire

L'esthétique musicale entre philosophie et musicologie,
des croisements aux rencontres

Vendredi 6 mai 2011 à 14h30

Maison de la recherche, 28 rue Serpente (75006), Salle D 224

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Rémy STRICKER (CNSMDP), « Interprétation et pensée complexe (Edgar Morin) ».

L'étude de l'interprétation, qui s'est répandue depuis quelques années, a franchi un pas décisif en cessant de considérer l'exécutant par rapport à la partition comme seul interprète, mais en attribuant à l'auditeur aussi ce statut, en dernier ressort pour ainsi dire.

Or quels que soient les résultats des observations faites en ce sens, le procédé consiste dès lors à remonter la chaîne interprétative des quatre instances que sont l'auditeur, l'exécutant, la partition et le compositeur, selon un axe linéaire.

L'apport novateur de la *pensée complexe* d'Edgar Morin devrait modifier cette perception classique en instaurant le système de la *boucle récursive* qui met ces quatre instances en continuelle interrelation.

En regard de la polysémie de la notion d'oeuvre en musique, oeuvre dont la réalité sonore n'existe en définitive que dans l'instant immédiat de son exécution/réception, la pensée complexe permet de concevoir toute interprétation non plus comme un objet figé par l'étude, mais comme un processus, en la replaçant dans un mouvement, inhérent au fait musical.

Julien SÉGOL (EHESS / CNSMDP), « *Oedipus Rex* de Stravinsky : l'opéra sous le signe de l'épique ».

Dans un article consacré au mythe d'Oedipe et à ses adaptations modernes, Walter Benjamin voit dans l'accès du Roi à une conscience réflexive la conquête d'une rationalisation, en même temps que le symptôme de sa modernisation. Nous voulons dans notre propos revenir sur l'évaluation moderne de la figure d'Oedipe à travers sa représentation dans l'opéra-oratorio de Stravinski, *Ædipus Rex*, et montrer dans quelle mesure ce retour à la source antique de la forme théâtrale est l'occasion pour le compositeur de liquider le poids d'une tradition. Il s'agira de montrer comment, en soumettant son matériau à la dialectique du formalisme, Stravinski parvient à détourner le matériau d'emprunt de sa fonction dramaturgique originelle pour proposer un théâtre qui semble s'inscrire, à bien des égards, dans une dimension « épique ».

Alessandro BERTINETTO (Università di Udine), « Musical ontology and improvisation ».

The contemporary philosophical debate about the ontological status of musical works seems sometimes to have too little to do with the actual musical practices and experiences. The 'platonist' or 'structuralist' concept of musical works as eternal types - that are supposed to be discovered (and not created) by the composers and then instantiated through each performance (as argued by N. Wolterstorff, P. Kivy and J. Dodd) - is an exemplary case of this manner of thinking.

In the wake of this view Philip Alperson once argued that improvisations should be conceived as types with a single token (a 'singleton'). This philosophical position is highly problematic, because it goes against two ordinary intuitions concerning both types and improvisations:

1. types may have, and usually do have, more than one token;
2. improvisations are ephemeral events, which are generated during their performance to the extent that they happen and disappear along with it, although they can be retained in recordings. Improvisations are processes, that occur here and now and then vanish 'in the course of performance'.

I will criticise Alperson's point about the ontology of musical improvisation, that it is at odds with what musicians commonly think about improvisation, and I will argue against it that musical improvisations are singular ephemeral *events*. Then I will claim that the practice of musical improvisation, for instance in jazz, shows a general failure of musical platonism: musical platonism turns erroneously the work-concept, which is a historical construct, into a metaphysical one (as stated, in different ways, by Lydia Goehr and Christopher Small). This failure results in its incapacity to grasp the specific ontological nature of music as a *human performing* (and continuously self-transforming) *practice*.

On the basis of this criticism I will finally argue that reorientating musical *ontology* upon the practice of improvisation helps to enlighten some basic facts about *musical ontology*, because musical improvisation puts on the stage the processual, temporal and historical character of music. This does not mean to reject the concept of "musical work", but to re-work it, in order to account for the temporal character of music: musical works are not like Plato's eternal "Forms"; they exist in the historical world and their identity (and our understanding of it) is as such subject to the flux of time. Hence, "musical works" may be conceived as the fixings of creative improvisations, that must be fluidified again, as it were, in order to exist. Therefore, unlike Plato's Forms, they are exposed to the risk, and to the chance, of self-transformation.

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